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How can ethnicity be produced? And how can it be 
produced in such a way that it does not appear as 
fiction, but as the most natural of origins? History 
shows us that there are two great competing 
routes to this: language and race. Most often the 
two operate together, for only their complement-
arity makes it possible for the ‘people’ to be re-
presented as an absolutely autonomous unit. Both 
express the idea that the national character (which 
might also be called its soul or its spirit) is im-
manent in the people. But both offer a means of 
transcending actual individuals and political re-
lations. They constitute two ways of rooting his-
torical populations in a fact of ‘nature’ …   
            (Balibar, 1991b:96-97). 
Abstract 
Nation building and the ‘struggle for Afrikaans’ under the new South African 
‘rainbow’ 
Although the geographical, technological and economic aspects of the 
South African nation have a reasonably stable basis, the socio-cultural 
aspect is not only contested, but has since 1994 led to new movements 
                                           
1 A draft of this paper was delivered at a conference of Anthropology Southern Africa, 
September 9-11, 2002, at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. The critical 
comments of Arnold S. de Beer, Francois A. de Villiers and the editorial readers are 
acknowledged. 
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and public debates regarding the recognition of the position of some 
categories/minorities and their rights in the newly-created democratic 
dispensation. It would not be correct to assume that all these ‘new’ move-
ments and voices are of a centrifugal nature and therefore indicative of 
potentially separatist tendencies. Whereas most of the evolution and 
history of ‘Afrikaans’ stemmed from its proponents’ opposition to the 
imposition of English and its imperialist backing, the current debate is about 
Afrikaans being displaced and relegated to a lowly position by an English-
speaking black-majority government. Surveying the nature and context of 
this public debate on the ‘position of Afrikaans’ will broaden the under-
standing of contemporary ‘nation building’ in South Africa. Again, social 
scientists could endeavour to comprehend culture ‘in the making’ as 
created by some of the ‘imaginative’ Afrikaans-speaking participants and 
the implications of this discourse for nation building and competition.  
Opsomming 
Nasiebou en die ‘stryd vir Afrikaans’ onder die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse 
‘reënboog’ 
Hoewel die geografiese, tegnologiese en ekonomiese aspekte van die 
Suid-Afrikaanse nasie ’n redelike stabiele basis het, word die sosio-
kulturele aspek nie slegs gekenmerk deur wedywering nie, maar het nuwe 
bewegings sedert 1994 tot openbare debatte gelei in verband met die 
erkenning en posisie van sommige kategorieë/minderhede en hulle regte in 
die nuutgeskepte demokratiese bestel. Dit sou foutief wees om te aanvaar 
dat al hierdie ‘nuwe’ bewegings en stemme sentrifugaal van aard is en 
daarom aanduidings van potensiële separatistiese neigings verteenwoor-
dig. Terwyl die meeste aspekte van die ontstaan en geskiedenis van 
‘Afrikaans’ te danke was aan die voorstanders daarvan se teenstand teen 
Engelstalige oorheersing en laasgenoemde se imperialistiese rugsteun, 
handel die huidige debat oor Afrikaans veral oor die vervanging en rele-
gering daarvan na ’n minderwaardige posisie deur ’n Engelssprekende 
swart meerderheidsregering. ’n Oorsig van die aard en konteks van die 
openbare debat oor die ‘posisie van Afrikaans’ sal begrip oor hedendaagse 
‘nasiebou’ in Suid-Afrika verbreed. Sosiaal-wetenskaplikes kan weer eens 
probeer om kultuur ‘in wording’ te begryp soos wat dit deur sommige 
‘verbeeldingryke’ Afrikaanssprekende deelnemers geskep word, en ook die 
implikasies van hierdie diskoers vir nasiebou en wedywering. 
1. Introduction 
Where does the South African nation find itself in the process of growth 
after the 1994 elections? What degree of cohesion has been achieved 
and how do member categories perceive their accommodation within the 
system-wide cultural patterns? The current public debate in the media on 
Afrikaans may make for an interesting case study to find some answers 
to these questions. 
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In his early theoretical essay of 1953 on nation building, Eric Wolf (see 
Wolf, 2001a:83) had the goal of “replacing the study of national character 
with a more historical and materially grounded approach to nation 
making” (see also Hofmeyr, 1987 & Sharp, 1988:82-84). Instead of 
treating the concept of nation as a homogeneous and ahistorical given, 
he thought we should focus on how nation building had brought together 
culturally heterogeneous populations and gradually fostered their inte-
gration into a larger structure through the proliferation of new “system-
wide cultural patterns”. Whether due to conquest or internal growth, new 
patterned relationships must permit the different groups to accommodate 
one another. Even the most exploitative socio-cultural segment must 
ensure that the exploited react to some of its symbols and signals to 
make everyday life possible, a view echoed by Giliomee (2000 & 2003). 
However, it is also true that the nation is the product of drawn-out and 
often painful processes of cultural growth in time and space (Wolf, 
2001a:85). 
In his study of nation building of the capitalist nations of the European 
Atlantic seaboard, Wolf discerned three stages, that is, localised nuclear 
development, territorial consolidation and the nation (Wolf, 2001a:86). In 
a certain superficial way the present South Africa had already reached 
this final stage in 1910, when the two British colonies and the two 
erstwhile Boer republics became the Union of South Africa, by control 
over a territory with defined limits and the ability to inhibit the processes 
of fission and fusion (see Wolf’s later essay; Wolf, 2001b:187).  
The incompleteness and superficial nature of this new state and its 
‘nation’ will interest the student of nation building. Not only are nations 
‘not eternal entities, without a beginning and without an end’, they may 
also exist for reasonably protracted times without ever becoming 
‘complete’ or even coming close to ‘homogeneity’. To have some degree 
of cohesion, politics, law, the army and the education system are usually 
reshaped to form new systems of hegemonic national cultures and to 
turn peasants into Frenchman; to make Italians inhabit a new unified 
Italy; to turn the fifty-odd German principalities into a German Reich 
(Wolf, 2001b:186); or even, in this case, to turn Thabo Mbeki’s ‘two 
nations’ (the rich whites and the poor blacks, Mbeki, 1998) into one 
nation.  
Apart from this division (over-?) emphasised by Mbeki (Jansen van 
Rensburg, 2003), the Constitution recognises eleven official language 
categories and the right of members of these categories to “use the 
language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice” (South 
Africa, 1996; the Constitution, Section 30). Of the movements currently 
emphasising diversity, the only ‘language’-based mobilisation is the 
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Afrikaans one. Understanding the arguments within the context of South 
African dynamics will facilitate a better understanding of the process of 
nation building. 
2. Historical overview 
In the 17th century competing European powers had ideals of forming 
power bases or states in Southern Africa without any consideration for 
possible nation building because they mainly operated according to the 
exploitative and limited ideals of colonialists. The early states formed in 
Southern Africa allowed the most elementary of civil rights to their 
‘citizens’. The necessity of forming common values and identifying with 
the state and a nation were not important everyday issues. Besides, the 
indigenous populations in Southern Africa were expected either to carry 
on with their own affairs in a ‘peaceful’ manner, or to fit into the 
construction of the social, economic, political, legal and ideological 
infrastructures of the new states (Wolf, 2001b:188). Where this inte-
gration was not deemed feasible the indigenous people were forcefully 
excluded or brought to the brink of extinction by the emerging satellite 
states of the European powers. 
In the period leading up to 1910, with the ultimate unification of the two 
British colonies and the two formerly autonomous Boer republics, 
indigenous people increasingly became politically relevant. In the Cape 
Province their very limited ‘citizenship’ indicated the slight possibility of 
their being considered part of a growing nation, but in the colony of Natal 
lip service was paid to their franchise and citizenship. The South African 
Republic (ZAR) and the Republic of the Free State were building partial 
‘nations’, explicitly not in favour of equality in church and state between 
whites and blacks (Thompson, 1960). 
To the dismay of the black elite in South Africa they were not involved in 
the nation-building efforts after 1910 (Davenport, 1988:249-52). It was 
politically expedient to reconcile Afrikaans- and English-speakers, ex-
cluding blacks from this effort. For a significant part of the nation in 
embryo reconciliation was a priority because the blacks, as the ‘others’ 
and their “dangerous political presence” had to be contained by whites 
(Thompson, 1960). Blacks were very important for the economic and 
industrial development of the state, and had to be used for the infra-
structural and economic development of the nation, but they were seen 
as an issue or problem that had to be handled, managed or contained, 
never really to be involved in nation building. 
Unification in 1910 repositioned Afrikaners (white Afrikaans-speakers) 
and English-speaking whites in a new South African state, but it did not 
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remove some of the issues dividing them in the past. The experiences of 
many white Afrikaans-speakers and their leaders regarding the frust-
ration of their less ambivalent racist views and practices, their wish for 
independence from the power of Britain and the imposition of British 
customs played a very important part in South African political life 
between 1910 and 1948. Any position in favour of reconciliation between 
white English-speakers and white Afrikaans-speakers was often per-
ceived as the betrayal of ‘Afrikaner ideals’.  
Already in the 1870s white Afrikaans-speakers organised themselves 
into ‘language’ movements. Spoken Afrikaans (consisting of Dutch-
Afrikaans dialects) was not a standardised and accepted language for 
so-called higher functions and Afrikaners were divided on whether Dutch 
or English should be preferred for public and official purposes. To make 
Afrikaans respectable, to reinvent it as a standard language, the very 
strong associations of poverty and particularly ‘colouredness’ which 
clung to the language had to be shaken off (Hofmeyr, 1987:104).  
The efforts of reinventing Afrikaans as a standard language and giving it 
literary respectability became more focused after the Anglo-Boer War, 
the policy of Anglicisation of Lord Milner after 1910, the First World War 
and the armed rebellion of certain sections of Afrikaner society. Not only 
must the development of Afrikaans during this period (1902-1924) be 
seen as a purposeful reconstruction of poor and marginalised Afrikaners, 
but the aspiring middle-class leaders began elaborating nationalist 
notions through the medium of literature (Hofmeyr, 1987). The inter-
relatedness of language and particular material and political interests is 
emphasised by Hofmeyr (1987:116):  
Their toils of socialising the poor consequently began to assume a 
particularistic content. For in the very moment that these educated 
Afrikaners were beginning to explore the category of ‘their nation’ 
through which they hoped to wrest some of capitalism’s benefits for 
themselves, they were discovering the support which could give their 
nationalist vision some substance and clout.2 
In 1925 Afrikaans became the second official language of the Union of 
South Africa, replacing Dutch. For decades Afrikaners complained about 
and acted against the ‘second-class’ position of Afrikaans, compared to 
English, the other official language. Although English could not and was 
not removed as official language in 1948 when the (Afrikaner) National 
                                           
2 O’Meara (1983:134-148) indicated how the struggle for Afrikaans was linked to 
Afrikaner nationalism and how the economic movement persuaded white Afrikaners to 
support mass economic upliftment. 
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Party came to power, it soon became a ‘second-class’ language in public 
affairs, mainly because the civil service became predominantly an 
Afrikaner domain and enabled Afrikaners to improve their economic and 
social positions. Also in the educational field, the position of Afrikaans 
was gradually strengthened. The view of the National Party government 
regarding the role of Afrikaans in education led to the founding of an 
Afrikaans-language university in Johannesburg and a double-medium 
university in Port Elizabeth to counter the influence of English-language 
universities. The strengthening of the position of Afrikaans also develop-
ed to the extent of arrogance (by the imposition of Afrikaans), which 
played a significant role in the eruption of unrest in black schools in 
Soweto and the rest of the country in 1976. 
In 1996 the second version of the new South African constitution was 
accepted and Afrikaans was affirmed as one of eleven official languages. 
It is possible to view the good intentions and the symbolic gesture of this 
proclamation as a basis for nation building by the constituent categories 
of the new nation. The symbolic gesture still has to take effect, however, 
on ground level and in everyday life.  
Although the ‘Madiba Era’ (from 1994 to 1999) was one of positive 
euphoria for many South Africans, and Nelson Mandela and other 
individuals such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu did much to convince 
South Africans that they were a ‘rainbow nation’, united in their diversity, 
no serious observer thought that the process of nation building would be 
simple and brief. Although South Africans have created symbolic forms 
of nation formation (such as a flag, emblems, holidays, monuments and 
others), the establishment of other important symbols such as the 
construction of a national aesthetic, the resurrection and reformulation of 
literature (oral and written) and the exaltation of a standard language 
have made little progress (cf. Mosse, 1975 as quoted by Wolf, 2001b: 
186). In the first years after 1994, concerns were raised because of the 
increased admission of other races to white schools. It was never clear 
whether resistance to this process was motivated by elitism and racism 
or possibly by the defence of Afrikaans as the medium of instruction at 
these schools. Also, the change in political leadership had to have its 
effect on the civil service, where the ‘language of record’ became 
English, a sharp turn-around from the dominance of Afrikaans in the civil 
service over several decades.  
In 2001 and 2002 the public debate on the position and status of 
Afrikaans intensified and focused on tertiary education and the position 
of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction at universities. This was mainly 
due to the work of the Gerwel Commission on this issue, and also to the 
decision of Cabinet to change the face of tertiary education dramatically. 
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The Minister of Education, in his plans for mergers in tertiary education, 
promised that the question of language would be dealt with in future. 
After a heated debate in the media regarding Afrikaans as a medium of 
instruction in tertiary education, Kader Asmal had talks with Afrikaans 
organisations,3 and in a reconciliatory address said that people should 
not derive pleasure from comparing him with Lord Milner or Andries 
Treurnicht, but that Afrikaners should return to the [conciliatory] spirit of 
1994. He also assured South Africans of the importance of mother-
tongue education, and that he did not want to destroy something that 
was so precious to people (Anon., 2002b:4; Joubert, 2002a; Joubert, 
2002b). Possibly because of the wide-ranging public debate, Cabinet 
accepted a language policy for higher education, thereby clearly accept-
ing Afrikaans as academic and scientific language and as a national 
asset. This new policy formulation also accepted Afrikaans as primary 
(but not only) medium of instruction in certain educational institutions and 
was seen by some people as a basis for the safeguarding of multi-
lingualism at the highest academic levels (Anon., 2002d:16).4 
The issue of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction in education was one 
of several related issues reported in the media. The argument was often 
found in various balanced views that, based on the Constitution, the 
dismissive approach of the government to Afrikaans and other indige-
nous languages, and the very easy acceptance of English as the lingua 
franca in South Africa, was not acceptable (Anon., 2001c:8; Anon., 
2002a:12).5 In the following analysis, attention will be paid to Afrikaans-
speaking participants in the debate, and also to the underlying tenets of 
their arguments. The position of the Minister of Education and 
government officials will not be analysed. 
                                           
3 More than 26 organisations (inter alia the South African Academy for Science and Art, 
the Freedom Front, the Group of 63 and Praag) conveyed their views on Afrikaans to 
the Minister of Education (Rademeyer, 2001:7). 
4 This approach is also supported by the government’s decision that all government 
documents must be published in at least six languages, which is seen as another way 
of making an important contribution to language and cultural democracy (Naudé, 
2002c:8; Nieuwoudt, 2002c:2). 
5 “It is a shame that after the adoption of the new Constitution, recognising 11 official 
languages, SA’s public-service television is still 70% English. Languages like Tsonga 
and Ndebele have no representation on public television, violating the constitutional 
rights of a large number of citizens …” (Msomi, 2002:20). 
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3. The mainstream or the old guard? 
A prominent discussant, Jaap Steyn, albeit with an emotional call on the 
history of Afrikaans and the struggle for the recognition of Afrikaans, 
keeps to the issue of language and is mostly careful with his use of 
terminology (see, however, his mention of ‘dangerous language detract-
ors’: gevaarlike taalversmaders; Steyn, 2002a:14). He avoids national-
istic and political issues by using phrases like Afrikaans-speakers or 
those with Afrikaans as a language (Afrikaanstaliges). However, he often 
finds it necessary to refer to the struggle of ‘Afrikaners’ for Afrikaans to 
illustrate some of his arguments. Sometimes he also ‘endangers’ his own 
broader approach by referring to a recent ‘spontaneous’ gathering of  
5 000 people at the Voortrekker Monument, which for him means that 
“somewhere we [i.e. the Afrikaners] are still attached to one another”, 
and that it would not be to the benefit of any ruler to ignore this because 
“[d]ivided, subjected and dishonoured peoples – as indicated by history – 
have a way of unexpectedly finding their soul again” (Steyn, 2002c:10). 
Elsewhere (and later) Steyn (2003:12) directly advocates Afrikaner 
nationalism by way of indicating a wide array of problems that 
‘Afrikaners’ are supposed to experience (including even Mbeki’s stance 
on Zimbabwe) and how this can be overcome (as with the mutual 
assistance (Helpmekaar) organisation of Afrikaners after the 1914 
Rebellion). This kind of nationalism can be built on economic self-
realisation, self-confidence, group loyalty, the willingness to sacrifice and 
to co-operate, thus helping to vanquish poverty and cultural imperialism 
(compare this with Hofmeyr’s analysis, quoted on page 195 of this 
article).  
One of the leading participants in the debate, Hermann Giliomee (2000: 
10), views with disdain the warnings of some commentators that activism 
for retaining the position of Afrikaans is dangerous, and thus creates the 
possibility of making Afrikaans-speakers, and especially ‘Afrikaners’, a 
punchbag for a future Mugabe-like regime. He actually sees “republican 
defensibility” (weerbaarheid) and probity as the correct and practicable 
option, using a liberal constitution with individual and language rights as 
a basis for action. According to him, republican probity would include 
taking responsibility for one’s language, as he also expects of at least 
some South African universities to do, but then in a constitutional and 
democratic manner and not as an exercising of a political ‘right’ 
(Giliomee, 2002c:12). Republicans, he says, ought to look beyond their 
individual rights and self-interest to what is honourable (Giliomee, 
2000:10; Giliomee, 2002c:12).  
This ‘honourable’ approach would not include a situation where 
historically Afrikaans universities consider their particular (sic) interest as 
more important than the common interest, viz. to work for the survival of 
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Afrikaans. He argues that in no way the struggle for retaining Stellen-
bosch as an Afrikaans university could possibly be misunderstood as 
proposing the existence of an Afrikaner university or an exclusively 
Afrikaans-language university, but at the same time he envisages 
Stellenbosch as a university with its “own character”, without indicating 
what this character might be (Giliomee, 2002g:10). 
Giliomee (2002a:12) also conveys his ideas about Afrikaans (and also 
about ‘Afrikaners’) by sketching a historical parallel between the peace 
talks in Vereeniging in 1902, ending the South African War/Anglo Boer 
War, and the more recent negotiations in South Africa, resulting in the 
1994 democratic elections. He implies that the driving force in both cases 
for ‘Afrikaners’ was  survival, with the loss of political autonomy.  
He considers the 1902 talks as much deeper and fundamentally about 
the nation’s honour and continued existence, whereas in the talks before 
1994, whites were mainly concerned with the protection of property 
rights, the pre-occupation of the middle-class. Extreme affirmative action 
was not taken seriously during the pre-1994 negotiations, the latter issue 
being more important to the less privileged (whites) who are not able to 
attain scarce skills.  
In his analysis of the post-1902 era he also indicates the divergent views 
among Afrikaner leaders. There were those who believed that the 
language (Dutch or Afrikaans) was the “channel through which the 
people could become a people again” (Giliomee, 2002a:12). Those who 
struggled for the language later also founded the exclusive and secret 
Afrikaner-Broederbond.  
The others, such as General Smuts and General Botha, did not share 
these views, but believed that there were other priorities: reconciliation 
with English South Africans, the economy and the expense of 
bilingualism in South Africa. (Giliomee’s personal footnote is that, in 
commemoration of May 1902, consideration should be given to the 
founding of an Afrikaans council where these issues of survival 
(materially and culturally) can be debated and where practical 
possibilities for the survival of Afrikaans as a public language as well as 
the challenge of affirmative action can be discussed.)         
When arguing for the use of standardised Afrikaans as a public 
language, and as a medium of instruction at some South African 
universities, Giliomee (2002c:12) mentions that only four languages 
(Hindu, Malay-Indonesian, Hebrew and Afrikaans) were standardised 
and implemented as public languages in the twentieth century. These 
languages were then also introduced as new languages of instruction at 
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universities. He regards this development positively and also states that 
universities in the USA and Europe with ‘particular’ natures must be 
regarded as assets. Not one of these universities of repute have 
changed its medium of instruction at undergraduate level or its nature as 
a “particular institution”. Giliomee mentions diversity and diversification 
with a positive nod, whereas he grossly generalises and then bemoans 
the situation at African universities north of South Africa and in the former 
South African ‘homelands’, which he depicts as major failures because, 
according to him, they initially had the ideal of university institutions with 
English as the medium of instruction.  
Many of Giliomee’s arguments (2002b:8) centre in his severe criticism of 
the language situation evolving at the University of Stellenbosch (US). 
Apart from policy and constitutional issues in which he engages with the 
Minister of Education and with management at the US, he again argues 
for the “rights of smaller languages”, particularly Afrikaans. He indicates 
the destructive effects of a centrist government policy (Giliomee, 
2002f:10) and US administration policy that are opposed to the ideal of 
“protecting and furthering the interest of Afrikaans in order to convey the 
language as a public language to the next generation”.  
He pleads the case against the universal facilitation of language 
assimilation, and although he acknowledges the arguments of his ad-
versaries, he does not acknowledge the implications of these arguments 
and how their existence weakens the weight and the effect of his own 
argument. First, his view of Afrikaans students’ positive attitude at 
Stellenbosch University to double-medium instruction6 is the following: 
“… of course, they accept it, they can improve their English at no cost – 
and most of them are not worried that Afrikaans will progressively pine 
away amidst parallel medium instruction, and that Afrikaans will not be 
available for the next generation students” (Giliomee, 2002b:8; see also 
Giliomee, 2002e:10). Secondly, he criticises the acceptance by all the 
principals of historically Afrikaans universities of the Education Minister’s 
parallel-medium plan because this will not enable the present generation 
to transmit Afrikaans as a public language to the next generation. It 
seems that in his reification of and romantic views regarding language7 
                                           
6 In an official survey at the University of Stellenbosch it was found that there was a 
significant difference in attitude between older and younger respondents. Students 
and younger members of the academic staff were ‘unemotional’ about the language 
issue. The Academic Interests Council (a student body) had the view that the 
language issue should be subservient to the interests of education and research (De 
Stadler, 2002:8; see also Ferreira, 2002a:3). 
7 Afrikaans is presented as a phenomenon or force outside human history. 
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he does not appreciate the importance of personal choice and that he 
thereby also places himself in the position of the next generation and 
imagines the loss that might befall them.8  
4. Dan Roodt’s “fire which destroys” and a “Prague spring”of 
nationalism 
Is it unreasonable to read a writer’s view and his stand on the position of 
Afrikaans through the lens of his views on Africa? I believe this approach 
is not unreasonable, and that Dan Roodt’s views on Africa will lead to a 
better understanding of the issues involved in this article. In his per-
spective on the burning of the Pretoria station in February 2001, Roodt 
(2001b) does not think that common-sense explanations such as 
poverty, unemployment and frustration are very effective in elucidating 
the incident. He would rather see South Africa as a multi-cultural country, 
where the clash of cultures and divergent perceptions of reality lead to 
violence and arson (see also Roodt, 2002c:18). According to him, the 
broader background necessary for understanding this phenomenon is 
the process of decolonisation in Africa which was always brought about 
through violence and destruction and therefore (seen through the eyes of 
Frantz Fanon) became the replacement of “one sort of human being” by 
“another sort of human being”, and also a replacement which was 
“totally, completely, absolutely … without transition …”.  
In this way, and by other similar analyses he removes African de-
colonisation (and the burning of the Pretoria station) from general human 
history and evaluates it as “rebellion against the domination of Western 
time concepts”, and “the African cleansing himself from Western in-
fluence, [and who] may find the architectural style of the [station] building 
equally offensive as the name” [Pretoria, which recently became part of 
the Tshwane local authority] (Roodt, 2001b).  
Roodt’s (2001b:30) own logic forces him to discuss the French Re-
volution and student unrest in the USA and Europe during the 1960s too, 
which immediately also leads to his cerebral acceptance of the social, 
economic and historic complexity of these types of actions by masses of 
people. However, his inability to appreciate fully the social context of the 
station incident seduces him into slipping ‘them’ back into the special 
                                           
8 Giliomee clearly operates with a specific view of the Afrikaans ‘language community’, 
and expects even more than allowed for in reality, as expressed by Balibar 
(1991b:99): “The language community is a community in the present, which produces 
the feeling that it has always existed, but which lays down no destiny for the 
successive generations”. 
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category he has created for Africans. He places them in the framework of 
N.P. van Wyk Louw’s drama, Raka. The perpetrators of arson (with 
Roodt even referring to standard works regarding mass action) are deftly 
removed from the general human context9 and pictured with a camp fire 
or a kraal fire in the tribal set-up where ritual and oral history are created 
as the antithesis of the ‘colonial report’ of written history.  
According to Roodt we should not be surprised when in the replacement 
of “one sort of human by another” (a la Fanon), and as “one culture is left 
behind and another is either created or rediscovered in the process of 
transformation”, fire figures repeatedly. Roodt thinks in terms of cultures 
clashing (inevitably?); the tendency of Africans for changing the un-
acceptable by means of violence; and the exclusiveness of human 
categories.  
Neo-racist discourses, rather than explicitly drawing on bio-determinism, 
imply an association between cultural autonomy and biological viability 
(Harrison, 1995:49). According to Balibar (1991a:23) this approach can 
even present itself (as in the case of Roodt it often does) as true 
humanism, and it connects easily with ‘crowd psychology’, as  
… a general explanation of irrational movements, aggression and 
collective violence, and, particularly of xenophobia. We can see here 
the double game … operating fully: the masses are presented by an 
explanation of their own ‘spontaneity’ and at the same time they are 
implicitly disparaged as a ‘primitive’ crowd. The neo-racist ideologues 
are not mystical heredity theorists, but ‘realist’ technicians of social 
psychology. 
This approach of Roodt will also influence the way in which he views the 
phenomenon of language and of Afrikaans and its ‘endangered’ position 
in ‘Africa’. 
Since the founding of Praag10 (Pro-Afrikaanse Aksiegroep) early in 2000, 
the public debate regarding the ‘status’ of Afrikaans became more 
heated. Although their leader, Dan Roodt, said that their action was 
about Afrikaans as an important language for cultural and communication 
                                           
9 An analysis of the burning of the Pretoria Station where the actions of the perpetrators 
of this incident is situated within the socio-economic and political parameters of South 
Africa and their own humanness, is given by Wilhelm Jordaan (2001:10). 
10 Dan Roodt, the leader, saw the founding of Praag as “an uprising against the 
prevailing order”, and also reminded the ruling party (the ANC) that they supported the 
Soviet take-over of Prague in 1969 and for this reason they were not in a position to 
lecture others when it came to [having] a dark history (Anon., 2000a:10). 
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purposes, he already foresaw not only debate and the writing of letters to 
prominent people, but also protests and “commando actions” which 
would state the position of Afrikaans in an enthusiastic and creative 
manner. Since then, both the leader and the organisation have often 
been in the news because of actions such as the following: 
• a protest action regarding the printing of only 600 000 census forms in 
Afrikaans,11 whereas according to Praag, South Africa had 5,5 million 
Afrikaans-speakers compared to the 3 million English-speakers;  
• trying to mobilise a number of Afrikaans organisations and political 
parties (inter alia the Freedom Front; Afrikaner Unity Movement 
(Afrikaner-Eenheidsbeweging – in essence the old Conservative 
Party) and the Christian National Forum to run a referendum among 
Afrikaans parents regarding the education of their children;  
• Roodt’s letters in newspapers on the removal of its Afrikaans name on 
the building of the South African Reserve Bank;  
• his involvement in the public debate on the position of Afrikaans at the 
Universities of Potchefstroom and Stellenbosch; and  
• his attacks on the Minister of Education (Floris, 2001; Jackson, 2002; 
Roodt, 2001a & 2001c; Anon., 2001c). 
Roodt does not shy away from controversy and confrontation (“Mr. Kader 
Asmal deserves a rotten tomato”; see Anon., 2001a). When criticised for 
his actions and rhetoric he calls on his democratic right to take part in the 
debate, the protection of Afrikaans in the Constitution, and the fact that 
the government is the provocateur and the oppressor (Anon., 2001a). He 
is not fazed when accused of being pro-apartheid in his efforts as an 
activist ‘for Afrikaans’.  
Accusations are levelled at him by his critics of his being ideologically 
dubious – as much as German idealism a la Fichte – and parallels are 
drawn between Afrikaner nationalism and Nazism. Roodt simply con-
siders these accusations as outdated and passé and claims that the 
apartheid ideology had certain liberal elements which should be 
recognised (Roodt, 2001c). In one of his speeches (Smith, C. 2002:6) 
Roodt proudly claims that “Afrikaners” will not use violence to regain their 
freedom in the way the “so-called freedom movements of Africa” had 
                                           
11 Praag also warned the ‘Afrikaans public’ that information gleaned from the 1939 
census in the Netherlands was used by the Nazis during the period of German 
occupation to persecute the Jews. Similarly, information on the present census forms 
could in future be used by a radicalised Africanist regime, such as that of Robert 
Mugabe, to persecute Afrikaans-speakers (Floris, 2001:5). 
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done, but at the same time he foresees the probability of a “Third War of 
Liberation” (the second one being the Anglo-Boer War). Also, he sees 
“Afrikaners” as the “peace makers of Africa who will not start another war 
in Africa, although ‘he’ [the Afrikaner] probably has the full right to do 
this”, because he is not really free and is oppressed by English culture, 
which in effect means that war has already been declared against the 
Afrikaner. 
It is not a simple matter to get to grips with some of the conceptual tools 
in Roodt’s arguments. It seems as if his earlier views may have been 
more focused on Afrikaans as a language and that later it became more 
nationalistic in content. It may also be that the general political set-up 
had shifted, thereby either enabling or pressuring leaders such as Roodt 
into a clearer nationalistic parlance. Although he argues that “[the] unity 
[of a nation] is not threatened by diversity of cultures, but by dis-
crimination against some of them” (Roodt, 2000), it does not seem as if 
he attaches any positive value to the existence of a nation and the 
existence of other societal forms of interaction, but only argues in terms 
of his ‘Afrikaners’ vis-a-vis ‘the others’.  
In his debate with Ebrahim Harvey (2000) Roodt becomes involved in the 
issue of whether Afrikaans, in its history of origin, can be regarded as a 
‘white’ or a ‘black’ language, which does not help to clarify anything, but 
clearly indicates his position as a nationalist demagogue. With regard to 
Afrikaans, he mostly uses significant words and phrases such as 
“Afrikaners”, “the Afrikaner”, “growing Afrikaner unity” and less often the 
more precise and inclusive “Afrikaans-speakers”.12 The removal of 
Afrikaans from the SA Reserve Bank building is for Roodt, “a favour to 
Afrikaners” because “… it relieves us from being a party to the shameful 
devaluation of the country’s currency …” (Roodt, 2001a:8). In his 
opposition to government policy and practice on language issues he 
does not shirk from selectively referring to instances of violence from the 
struggle era and then subliminally interpreting incidents (which may also 
be regarded by others as activities of the ANC against the apartheid 
system) rather as black on white terror (Roodt, 2002a:10).  
Roodt (2002c:30) refers to his solitary struggle to give back to ‘the 
Afrikaner’ ‘his’ self-respect, and a pride in ‘his’ language and history. His 
choice of relevant historical incidents and symbols is focused on the 
arrival of white settlers in 1652 (for Roodt this event represents the 
founding of the nation); the national anthem (for Roodt this means Die 
                                           
12 According to Prof. Hein Willemse (University of Pretoria), 55% of all Afrikaans-
speakers in 1996 were black people (Willemse, 2002a:13). 
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Stem); he wants the Prince’s flag or the orange-white-and-blue 
(Prinsevlag or oranje-blanje-blou) to be embraced as a singularly 
Afrikaans flag. When highlighting Roodt’s nationalist talk, one should not 
be blind to the partial truths in some of his statements, as when he 
argues that South Africa has become a “language dictatorship” (Roodt, 
2002b:16) and also how these incidents and perceptions can influence 
people to follow him. Also, it should be noted that, although Giliomee and 
Steyn have a different style from Roodt, some of their arguments on 
language rights do converge.       
5. Clearer political motives? 
Cassie Aucamp (2002:12), leader of the Afrikaner Unity Movement 
(Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging), a movement that holds one seat in the 
National Assembly, does not see how there could be a language struggle 
without politics being involved. Also Carel Boshoff IV (2002:13), of 
Orania, berates many of the Afrikaans language activists because of 
their lack of understanding of the political reality in South Africa and 
states that many of them (such as Roodt) have belated delusions of 
Afrikaner power (Boshoff, 2000b). Boshoff believes ‘Afrikaners’ should 
rather strive for more limited “cultural spaces and a more limited political 
power position, which will conform to their minority status”. He sees the 
ideals of Orania and its high level of autonomy as the only solution for a 
small minority such as ‘the Afrikaner’ in delineating themselves and 
making a claim within a geographical set-up that will not doom them to 
permanent minority status.  
Although Boshoff (2000a:8) viewed the 1999 election as the end of the 
‘Afrikaner’ as a political community, he now sees the development of the 
recent debate as a sign of the Afrikaner’s rising like a phoenix from the 
ashes. Even if the “new order” in South Africa wanted to do it (Boshoff, 
1999:10), it does not have the resources to promote the Afrikaans 
language in education or in public life. And if this cannot be attained, he 
writes, what about “my values, history and ideals that have [already] 
been doomed to the private domain?” According to Boshoff, unity among 
Afrikaners must be sought in order to create a programme with certain 
steps so as to gain economic and/or political autonomy. (It would be a 
grave mistake to assume that all those who actively campaign for 
Afrikaans are simply isolationists or have plain separatist political 
programmes (see Goosen, 2002:13)).  
6. Those on the fringes of the ‘Afrikaanse struggle’ 
Although intellectuals such as Giliomee and Roodt may have significant 
support, they also have a range of influential critics within the cadre of 
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Afrikaans-speakers. A number of issues are often mentioned which make 
specific categories of Afrikaans-speakers negative or sceptical about the 
‘struggle’’. Two black Afrikaans-speakers, Hein Willemse and Ebrahim 
Harvey, have problems with Roodt’s political position on apartheid and 
his insensitivity to the issue of race; others feel that more minority groups 
should be involved; the probability of Praag’s becoming a home for 
rightwing supporters is a very common concern; others are sceptical 
because the actions of Praag are again those of a group of white 
‘Afrikaner-men’ and some say that any formally organised action would 
inevitably lead to the forming of another power block; a plea is made by 
Jakes Gerwel for real inclusiveness of Afrikaans-speakers without the 
confining involvement with group identity and requiring the rejection of 
aggressive bitterness and lowly whining13 of those “struggling” for 
Afrikaans (Anon., 1999:2; see also Boshoff, 2000a:8; Anon., 2000b:2).  
Prominent Afrikaans writers, Marlene van Niekerk (on this issue she is, 
as she says fokken gatvol), Koos Kombuis, Antjie Krog and journalist 
Max du Preez are severely criticised by the taalstryders because they, as 
the “old left white”, do not have “any sense of democratic revolt”, where-
as Max du Preez (Goosen & Duvenage, 2002:13) sticks to his view that 
these activists for Afrikaans are white men who have lost their power and 
status – the belly-achers want to abuse Afrikaans as a battering-ram 
because of their discontent with the present majority politics and 
Afrikaner men’s loss of power and status14 (Naudé, 2002a:18)).  
It is rumoured that, since 2002, some of the most prominent members of 
the Group of 63 (G63) have distanced themselves from the group,15 
whereas one of them, poet and dramatist Breyten Breytenbach, after 
criticism of “The Play” (Die Toneelstuk) and fears by some commentators 
that this play could alienate him from ‘Afrikaners’, responded by writing: 
“… I would like to reassure you and your readers. Under no circum-
stances am I a member of your people (volk) or would I desire to be” 
(Anon., 2001b:1). This was not surprising, taking into account that 
                                           
13 … aggressiewe bitterbekkigheid en kleinlike keffery … 
14 “Die klomp bitterbekke [wil] Afrikaans as ’n stormram misbruik vir hulle onverge-
noegdheid met die huidige meerderheidspolitiek en Afrikaner-mans se verlies aan 
mag en status …” 
15 G63 landed themselves in a turmoil of political controversy by writing a letter to Presi-
dent Thabo Mbeki, linking the frustrations of Afrikaners and rightwing bomb planters 
(Anon., 2002e:8). They were severely castigated for being politically naive, for bad 
timing, not representing anyone but themselves, being insensitive and again using 
volatile and dangerous Afrikaner myths in their recent actions (Scholtz, 2002:8; 
Naudé, 2002b:16; Jeffreys, 2002:14; Malan, 2002:15). 
 Fanie (N.S.) Jansen van Rensburg 
Koers 68(2 & 3) 2003:191-216 207 
already in 1999 (Breytenbach et al., 1999:8), in the run-up to ‘the 
Afrikaner’ debate in Parliament, writers Breyten Breytenbach and André 
P. Brink, literary critic Ampie Coetzee and business man Frederik Van 
Zyl Slabbert said they did not know who these ‘Afrikaners’ were, who the 
‘we’ included, and how many people they represented. Breytenbach went 
even further and decided not to publish in Afrikaans any more but to 
send his poems to only a selected few (Greyling, 2002:16; Kombuis, 
2002:21).   
7. The brown/black Afrikaans-speakers 
The manner in which loose interest groupings like the Group of 63 (G63) 
operate, does not help to shed light on the issues under review. Although 
they do not use the nationalist rhetoric of Roodt and Praag, and more 
clearly have the interests of Afrikaans as language as their main goal, 
they also seem to want an Afrikaans Council that should give advice on 
issues concerning the ‘Afrikaner’ [exclusive] or Afrikaans [inclusive?]. 
G63 also has in mind the recognition of language and socio-economic 
interests of minorities (Barrell, 2000:8).16 They have not sufficiently 
engaged with the fact that a number of ‘brown’ intellectuals have already 
indicated that they cannot associate with the nature of the present 
language struggle (Joubert, 2002c:13). ‘Brown’ thinkers supporting the 
protection of Afrikaans and other official languages often have a broader 
and explicitly multiracial approach (Esack, 2000:6; Anon., 2000c:7). 
Jakes Gerwel (Anon., 1999:2) sees being Afrikaans-speaking as “dyna-
mic, encompassing all political, social, economic, ethnic, cultural, 
religious and other forms of expression and experience”.  
Hein Willemse (2002b:10) warns against the “ethnic-ideological thinking 
by means of which the schism between the own group and the other” is 
often argued in the Afrikaans language debate. He feels that language 
then becomes property that has to be protected and refined (veredel). 
The ‘group’ is then defined by means of the language and this becomes 
the basis for mobilisation and the staking of political and historical claims. 
In the long run this then becomes the basis for intolerance that can have 
                                           
16 The Deliberation Platform (Oorlegplatform), under the leadership of Hermann Gilio-
mee, and with very prominent supporters, in August 2002 submitted proposals on a 
language policy to the University of Stellenbosch. Some of the supporters are: André 
P. Brink, Ampie Coetzee, Lawrence Schlemmer, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, Richard 
van der Ross, Ton Vosloo  and David Welsh. Giliomee feels that, while the US ought 
to be of service to and empower the whole Afrikaans language community, the 
government wants English as medium of instruction, and thereby also to impose its 
hegemony in a tangible way in the cultural field (Mischke, 2002a:1; Mischke, 2002b: 
22: Ferreira, 2002b:3). 
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devastating end results. Likewise, Neville Alexander does not see the 
present debate as being about the interests of Afrikaans, but rather about 
“ethnic nationalism”, something he considers very dangerous. However, 
this does not detract from Alexander’s clear view on the constitutional 
right of a university like Stellenbosch to be mainly or predominantly 
Afrikaans (Van der Merwe, 2002:45). 
Willemse (2002b:10) also objects to trenches being dug around 
Afrikaans by persons claiming to be acting on behalf of Afrikaners and 
sometimes even on behalf of Afrikaans-speakers. He reminds his 
readers that Afrikaans is also the language of the very poorest, and then 
mostly their only language. They do not have access to the language of 
the city dweller, the middle class or the bureaucracy. Therefore they 
need a language that will give them access to the authorities and to all 
forms of education. He protests against the “Afrikaner-centrism” and 
nationalistic stance of many of the protagonists and that they have not 
even started listening to ‘alternative’ views built on an “Afrikaans 
experience” which is definitely non-racial (Willemse, 2002c:10; Willemse, 
2002d:8).  
8. The indifferent generation, women and expatriates 
Although the younger generation has a new interest in Afrikaans, such as 
in the rediscovery of Afrikaans folk music, they do not feel Afrikaans is 
threatened in any way. They also use Afrikaans without feelings of guilt 
or hang-ups. The desperate “struggle for Afrikaans” is absent among the 
Afrikaans-speaking youth and in many ways Afrikaans is showing many 
signs of new life (Jordaan, 2002:5; Naudé, 2002a:18). Karen Zoid with 
her hit: Afrikaners is plesierig (Afrikaners are a jolly lot), does not want to 
be possessed by Afrikaners and sees herself as a member of 
… the first generation that is integrated. We do not have to fight for any-
thing. What irritates us are the old men (ou omies) who expect us to 
sing in Afrikaans, write songs in Afrikaans, do your thing for the 
promotion of Afrikaans, who want to make you part of a struggle … I am 
here to sing (Smith, I. 2002:16).  
The reasons for the indifference of the youth may be some of those 
mentioned by John van Rooyen, who says:  
Ostensibly they fight for survival of Afrikaans, but we believe they fight 
to keep the US [University of Stellenbosch] white. They just can’t admit 
it. Therefore they say ‘keep it Afrikaans’ (Van der Merwe, 2002:45; see 
also Nieuwoudt, 2002a & Van Eeden, 2002). 
The silence of ‘Afrikaner’ women on the matter of their mother tongue 
may be an indication of their subservient role and their reliance on men 
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to conduct the public debate. It might also be that the ferocity of attacks 
on women makes them shy away from the debate. Often the criticism 
against women like Antjie Krog, Sonja Loots, Marlene van Niekerk and 
Karen Zoid is directed against them as women per se (Van der 
Westhuizen, 2002:14). 
Apart from participating in other public debates in the media, ex-
patriates17 often express their views regarding their changed status and 
some even worry about Afrikaners in, for instance, Australia who become 
Anglicised so easily. Parents speak to their children in English and adult 
Afrikaans-speakers tend to converse in English. Metaphorically, like 
whales running ashore, Grobler (2002:11), from Australia, says: “They 
have lost their will to live [as Afrikaners].” In other cases, such as in 
Canada, the view is that there it is actually easier to ‘be Afrikaners’. They 
keep many Afrikaans traditions and are recognised as a minority with 
certain rights (Alberts, 2002:9). 
Expatriate white Afrikaans-speakers attended arts festivals in Britain, 
such as Ukkasie 2002 and Ukkasie 2003, in large numbers and will 
probably do the same when similar festivals are held in Canada and New 
Zealand in future. Some of those who attended Ukkasie 2002 were 
shocked by the crass and militant sentiments that could be found here. A 
T-shirt with: “Speak Afrikaans or shut up” (Praat Afrikaans of hou jou 
bek) was seen at the festival. They were also dissatisfied with the very 
visible presence of a white South African political party, the Freedom 
Front (Relaas, 2002:8) at Ukkasie. Several successful national (mainly 
Afrikaans) arts festivals have not only become important occasions for 
the promotion of ‘Afrikaans culture’, but also for introspection and lively 
debate on the true meaning of Afrikaans, being Afrikaans-speaking and 
also Afrikaner identity and South African identity (Nieuwoudt, 2002b:17; 
Anon., 2002c:8). 
9. Conclusions 
Actions somewhat similar to the ‘struggle for Afrikaans’ might also be 
seen in the founding of and support for the Inkatha Freedom Party), the 
Freedom Front and the Afrikaner Unity Movement (‘AEB’), the Lemba 
Cultural Association, some Islamic tenets in PAGAD, and more recently, 
                                           
17 “There is excitement because of the proposal to buy an island off the Australian coast 
for R12,5 million. This is not envisaged as a volkstaat, but rather as a culture colony 
for Afrikaners where full cultural autonomy and local government will be practised” 
(Wingard, 2002:10). 
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the founding of the Khoisan Association.18 White Afrikaans-speakers 
have a long and ‘successful’ history of struggling ‘for Afrikaans’, thereby 
actually organising themselves for political action,19 not realising that “the 
vernacular itself is not nearly as unitary or as widely shared as nationalist 
ideology implies” (Fishman, 1974:410; cf. Sharp, 1988 & Hofmeyr, 
1987).20   
The perceptions of some white Afrikaners (according to Lawrence 
Schlemmer’s MarkData) regarding the efficiency of state administration, 
safety and crime, affirmative action, as well as signs of enmity against 
‘their’ language, tend to be rather negative (Naudé, 1999:12; see also 
Steyn, 2002b:10). It is therefore not surprising that Giliomee (2002d:10; 
see also Giliomee, 2003:8) develops his argument regarding the right 
and position of Afrikaans, also at universities, in the wider context of 
democracy.  
He views criticism and the right to oppose as important facets of a real 
democracy. Even in well-established democracies, the tolerance of 
minorities using their freedom to emphasise their group identity and to 
have grievances removed is not well developed. Therefore (according to 
Giliomee) exactly this sort of action will strengthen our democratic 
dispensation.21 He says that, especially in Africa, one often finds there 
might be initial reconciliation, followed a decade or two later by acts 
against minorities, like intimidation, Africanisation of the civil service and 
land grabs. Giliomee feels that our democracy is strong enough for civil 
society to organise, to debate issues actively, and to mobilise certain 
issues that they consider important for themselves. He says the im-
portance of these actions, in this case the struggle for the position of 
Afrikaans, will emphasise the right of minorities to be heard and to take 
                                           
18 Broadly, these movements can be seen as organisational expressions of ethnic 
identity, where ethnicity, class and categorical belongingness make sense to people 
(Eriksen, 1993:60). 
19 In his broad analysis of Afrikaans language movements of the past, Du Plessis 
(1986:14) concludes that “a language movement is a political and/or religiously 
inspired movement where language is used very pertinently as a means to a goal”. 
20 Trapido (1978) indicated how, in the 1880s in the rural South African Republic (ZAR), 
tensions ran high regarding class and the differential access to land. 
21 See also Wolf’s (2001a) view that “new patterned relationships must permit the 
different groups to accommodate each other”. 
 Fanie (N.S.) Jansen van Rensburg 
Koers 68(2 & 3) 2003:191-216 211 
part in a process where not only the majority can decide on the basis of 
their majority position. 22  
This sentiment underscores Wolf’s (2001a) idea that “even the most 
exploitative sociocultural segment must ensure that the exploited react to 
some of its symbols and signals to make everyday life possible”. Making 
everyday life possible within the complexity of the modern state is 
extremely difficult exactly because ‘nation’ and ‘ethnic group’ (also using 
‘language rights’) are “ideas which people use to confirm or challenge the 
legitimacy of states” (Saul, 1979, as quoted by Sharp, 1988:81).  
Although the emotional claims used in the debate regarding the position 
of ‘Afrikaans’ have the power of mobilising a following, they definitely 
have their intrinsic limitations in alienating ‘brown’ Afrikaans-speakers, 
the youth and those who still remember the destructive effects of 
Afrikaner nationalism in the apartheid days. The admonition by a social 
scientist of even the best debaters’ reification of language and culture 
and the nationalist and racist consequences of this will have no value in 
clarifying the issues or containing emotional leaders or their frustrated 
followers. These dynamics can only be balanced in a ‘national state’ by 
means of political sensitivity and proficiency. The obvious question is 
whether the ideal of nation building, with its enormous and critical 
agenda, should necessarily marginalise some categories and thereby 
provide nationalist leaders like Roodt with a following. 
To assume that language, and specifically the mother tongue, has 
nothing to do with nation building would be a grave error (Fishman, 
1974). Although universities and schools should ideally always be 
accessible to ‘outsiders’, Omotoso (2002a:10) indicates how all older 
universities have been a reflection of the aspirations and ideals of 
‘communities’. Of course, this is only one side of the coin, since 
universities also have the function of being critical of the social order in 
which they are situated. Some sort of association, however, between 
society or sections of society and universities, is inevitable and even 
necessary, and more so since South Africans have only taken the first 
steps on the way to nationhood and towards facilitating the accommo-
dation of categories and groups in the new dispensation. Therefore, 
sound pragmatic arguments for the position and role of Afrikaans and 
                                           
22 Giliomee and the other ‘language bulls’ (taalbulle) are leaders in forms of boundary 
maintenance, which have become important because the boundaries are under 
pressure, and they all perceive a continuity with the past that “function[s] in a 
psychologically reassuring way for the individual in times of upheaval”, providing an 
important source of self-respect and personal authenticity (Eriksen, 1993:68). 
Nation building and the ‘struggle for Afrikaans’ under the new South African ‘rainbow’  
212 Koers 68(2 & 3) 2003:191-216 
other languages in South African nation building can often be found (see 
also Omotoso, 2002b:8).  
In the public sphere in South Africa there are very few signs of “new 
systemwide cultural patterns”. It is crucial for these new cultural patterns 
to allow for the accommodation of ‘diversity’, but it is also very true that 
“we think too much of constructing identities – a new national identity, 
rather than a national alliance built on the overlap of historical experien-
ces, and respectful of their differences” (Sharp, 2001:71, referring to 
Haraway, 1989 & Gilroy, 1995). Clearly, the complexity of the views on 
the ‘struggle for Afrikaans’ bears this out.  
At the stage where large numbers of Afrikaans-speakers in their diversity 
might find common ground for action in the interest of Afrikaans as an 
official language, the other overlapping identities will necessitate allian-
ces between categories with different histories/experiences, religions, 
material interests and political views. This would be nation building that 
really might be in the interest of the nation in the making, and by 
advocating the continued use of Afrikaans, those with diverse material 
interests and historical backgrounds could promote the building of the 
nation – until the time is ripe for another major transformation.  
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